During 1985, the state deployed large numbers of South African Defence Force (SADF) troops into townships to support the South African Police (SAP). This blurred the line between military and civilian policing and helped normalize “security” solutions to political protest. The move also strengthened local enforcement capacity for detentions, raids, and crowd control.
By the mid-1980s, the National Security Management System (NSMS)—officially announced in 1979—helped coordinate security policy from the national level down to local Joint Management Centres. This structure supported a more centralized, security-driven approach to governing unrest, including surveillance and coordinated operations. It contributed to the broader militarization of policing by linking police, military, and intelligence planning.
On July 20, 1985, President P.W. Botha announced a state of emergency covering 36 magisterial districts, mainly in the Eastern Cape and the PWV (now Gauteng) region. It was the first state of emergency since 1960 and marked a major escalation in how the apartheid state responded to township protest. The measures expanded police powers, including detention and curfews, setting the stage for more militarized policing.
Beginning July 21, 1985, emergency rules came into force in the listed districts. Reports at the time described increased detentions and expanded authority for police and security forces under the emergency framework. This early phase previewed the wider national emergency that would follow in 1986.
On June 12, 1986, the government declared a country-wide state of emergency. The nationwide emergency greatly expanded detention powers and restrictions on political activity, and it was renewed repeatedly in the following years. It became a central tool for the apartheid state’s intensified security approach between 1986 and 1990.
By June 16, 1986, emergency regulations had tightened controls on journalists, including limits on entering unrest areas and reporting on security-force actions. These rules reduced independent scrutiny of policing and military operations in townships. The information crackdown also shaped how violence and repression were documented and understood inside and outside South Africa.
On June 26, 1986, the Public Safety Amendment Act (Act 67 of 1986) came into effect, amending the Public Safety Act of 1953. It empowered the Minister of Law and Order to declare “unrest areas” and issue regulations aimed at combating or preventing unrest. This provided another legal channel for exceptional policing measures during the emergency period.
On June 11, 1987, the state of emergency was renewed, and police powers were expanded again. In this period, emergency rules increased the state’s ability to detain people and restrict movement and organization. Renewals signaled that emergency governance was becoming a long-term framework rather than a short-term response.
In late August 1987, the government announced additional media restrictions under emergency authority, including powers to close publications or impose pre-publication censorship in some cases. These steps increased the risks for journalists and editors reporting on protest, policing, and state violence. The regulations reinforced the security state by reducing public access to independent accounts of events.
On February 24, 1988, the government “restricted” 17 organizations, including the United Democratic Front (UDF), effectively preventing many lawful political activities. Restrictions also affected trade union organizing by limiting what could be treated as “political” action. This clampdown pushed more opposition work underground and increased reliance on security enforcement to manage dissent.
On June 10, 1988, another extension of the national state of emergency took effect. Contemporary reporting noted that the extension tightened the government’s grip on media and anti-apartheid organizations and drew strong criticism from major public figures. Repeated extensions showed how emergency powers had become embedded in day-to-day governance.
On August 21, 1989, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) ad hoc Committee on Southern Africa adopted the Harare Declaration. It urged steps to create a climate for negotiations and a new constitutional order based on democratic principles. The declaration helped frame growing international and regional pressure for a negotiated end to apartheid-era repression.
On November 28, 1989, President F.W. de Klerk stated that the National Security Management System (NSMS) would be disbanded. This signaled a shift away from the highly centralized “total strategy” security governance associated with the emergency period. It also aligned with the government’s broader move toward political reform and negotiations.
On February 2, 1990, President de Klerk announced the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other organizations. This opened space for legal political mobilization and negotiations, reducing the state’s reliance on emergency powers as the main tool of control. The announcement marked a major turning point from security-first rule toward a negotiated transition.
On June 7, 1990, de Klerk lifted the nationwide state of emergency that had been in place since June 12, 1986, while retaining special emergency powers in Natal. Lifting the emergency reduced detention and censorship powers across most of the country and was intended to improve the climate for negotiations. Keeping it in Natal reflected ongoing political violence there, especially linked to conflict involving Inkatha and ANC supporters.
On October 18, 1990, de Klerk lifted the state of emergency in Natal province. Ending emergency rule there removed one of the last remaining formal pillars of the mid-1980s security state. This helped open space for broader political activity and negotiations, even as violence and policing challenges continued into the transition period.
States of Emergency and Militarization of Policing (1985–1990)