By 1934, the Nationalist government’s Fifth Encirclement Campaign tightened a blockade around the Chinese Soviet base in Jiangxi. Facing major losses and shrinking supplies, the Communist leadership decided on a large-scale breakout and strategic retreat that became the Long March.
The main Communist force (often called the First Front Army) left the Jiangxi base area and moved westward to escape encirclement. Roughly 86,000 people set out, including soldiers and key Party and government staff, turning a planned withdrawal into a grueling cross-country trek.
Nationalist forces blocked key crossings at the Xiang River, and the Red Army took heavy casualties while trying to break through. The scale of losses damaged morale and intensified internal criticism of existing military leadership and strategy.
After the Xiang River setback, senior Communist leaders met at Tongdao to reassess strategy. The meeting reflected growing frustration with earlier decisions and set the stage for later leadership changes during the march.
In early January 1935, the Red Army crossed the Wu River, moving deeper into Guizhou province. This maneuver helped the force avoid some pursuing units and created conditions for a major leadership conference soon afterward.
At the Zunyi Conference, Party leaders reviewed recent defeats and criticized prior command decisions. The meeting elevated Mao Zedong’s influence in military affairs and marked a turning point in who set strategy during the remainder of the march.
From January to March 1935, the Red Army repeatedly crossed the Chishui River to confuse and evade larger Nationalist forces. This series of maneuvers is often summarized as “crossing the Chishui River four times,” highlighting the shift toward more flexible movement.
In early May 1935, the Red Army crossed the Jinsha River (upper Yangtze), escaping the immediate threat of being trapped. The crossing helped the marchers push toward western China, but also led them into difficult terrain and new conflicts.
On May 29, 1935, Communist troops seized Luding Bridge, a critical chain bridge over the Dadu River. Capturing the bridge helped the Red Army continue its retreat route, and later became one of the march’s best-known episodes.
In mid-1935, Mao’s First Front Army linked up with Zhang Guotao’s Fourth Front Army in Sichuan. Disagreements over where to move next led to a split, with Mao pushing toward northern Shaanxi while Zhang’s forces took a different route with severe later losses.
The Lazikou Pass, a narrow and fortified mountain gateway, was the last major obstacle before reaching safer areas farther north. Its capture in September 1935 helped open the route into Gansu and toward Communist-held territory in the northwest.
On October 19, 1935, the main force of the First Front Army reached Wuqi in the Shaanxi-Gansu border region. Only a small fraction of those who started remained, but arriving in the northwest preserved the core leadership and enabled building a new base area.
In November 1935, Communist forces fought the Zhiluo Town campaign in Shaanxi and captured thousands of prisoners and weapons. The victory improved the Red Army’s position in the northwest and supported consolidation of the new base area after the march’s hardest phase.
By October 1936, other major Red Army forces (including the Second and Fourth Front Armies) completed their own retreat routes and linked up with the First. The meeting at Jiangtaibao marked the widely cited conclusion of the Long March as a unified strategic withdrawal.
The Long March (1934–1936)