The Peace of Amasya ended the 1532–1555 Ottoman–Safavid war and set a durable framework for competition in the Caucasus by dividing influence: western Armenia and western Georgia to the Ottomans, eastern Armenia and eastern Georgia to the Safavids.
A new Ottoman–Safavid war began in 1578, with major operations in the Caucasus. The conflict became a decisive phase of the wider contest for control over Georgia, Shirvan, and neighboring regions.
Signed in Istanbul, the 1590 treaty (also known as the Treaty of Ferhad Pasha) ended the 1578–1590 war and recognized extensive Ottoman control in the southern Caucasus, including large parts of Safavid-held Georgia and other territories, marking a high point of Ottoman expansion in the region.
Shah Abbas I retook Tabriz from Ottoman control on 21 October 1603, initiating a major Safavid counteroffensive that sought to reverse the 1590 settlement and restore Safavid authority across the Caucasus and northwest Iran.
During the 1603–1612 war, Safavid forces steadily recovered lost northern territories; the 1607 siege of Shamakhi (with Baku and Derbent also surrendering) helped restore Safavid control across key Caspian-facing areas tied to Caucasus governance and trade routes.
The Treaty of Nasuh Pasha concluded the 1603–1612 conflict: the Ottomans agreed to return territories gained under the 1590 treaty, effectively reverting to the Amasya (1555) border line and reaffirming Safavid predominance across much of the Caucasus.
After war resumed (1615–1618) amid disputes including the silk-tribute clause, the 1618 Treaty of Serav (Sarab) ended hostilities and stabilized Ottoman–Safavid relations for a period, keeping the Caucasus question temporarily contained diplomatically.
Following the 1623–1639 war, the Treaty of Zuhab (Qasr-e Shirin) confirmed a durable Ottoman–Safavid boundary. It formalized a partition of the Caucasus, with areas such as eastern Georgia and parts of Armenia remaining under Safavid control while western Georgia and much of western Armenia fell under Ottoman rule.
As Safavid power fractured in the early 18th century, the Ottoman Empire launched a new war (1723–1727) in the Caucasus and adjacent regions, exploiting the vacuum to annex or occupy strategic Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani territories.
The 1724 Russo–Ottoman Treaty of Constantinople divided large portions of Safavid Iran’s northern and western territories between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, including significant areas in/around the Caucasus—an internationalization of the contest that reshaped bargaining power on the ground.
In October 1727, the Treaty of Hamedan ended the Ottoman–Hotaki War and formalized a settlement that helped the Ottomans secure gains made during the broader regional breakdown, reinforcing the strategic depth behind Ottoman Caucasus operations.
The 1732 Treaty of Resht reversed part of Russia’s early-1720s gains by returning provinces south of the Kura River (including Gilan, Mazandaran, and Astarabad) to Iran, an important diplomatic step that supported renewed Iranian campaigns to expel Ottoman control from the Caucasus.
Signed near Ganja on 10 March 1735, the treaty brought Russia into alignment with Iran against the Ottomans and provided for the return of remaining Russian-held territories in the North and South Caucasus (including Derbent and Baku), strengthening Iran’s position in the Caucasus contest.
The 1743–1746 Ottoman–Persian war concluded with the Treaty of Kerden, which largely restored the status quo ante bellum. Coming after Iran’s recovery under Nader Shah, it signaled the end of this early-modern phase of Ottoman–Iranian contention affecting the Caucasus frontier system.
Safavid–Ottoman contest for the Caucasus (16th–18th centuries)
