The U.S. State Department announced it would bar future U.S. arms sales to Venezuela, citing concerns about Venezuela’s cooperation in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This early measure set the tone for later, broader sanctions by using restrictions on defense trade as leverage in bilateral relations.
Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014. The law directed targeted sanctions—focused on individuals linked to human-rights abuses during protests—and also included support for Venezuelan civil society. This statute became a key legal building block for later executive-branch actions.
President Obama issued Executive Order 13692, declaring a national emergency related to the situation in Venezuela and authorizing asset-blocking and travel restrictions on certain persons. The order cited human-rights concerns, repression of political opponents, and public corruption. This created the core “national emergency” framework that later Venezuela sanctions expanded.
President Trump issued Executive Order 13808, which imposed major financial restrictions tied to Venezuela. It prohibited certain new debt and new equity transactions involving the Government of Venezuela and PDVSA, as well as certain dealings in specified government bonds and dividend payments. These measures were designed to limit access to new financing while still stopping short of blocking the entire Venezuelan government.
President Trump issued Executive Order 13827, prohibiting U.S. persons from transacting in digital currency, digital coins, or digital tokens issued by or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela after January 9, 2018. The action targeted Venezuela’s state-backed cryptocurrency project (widely associated with the “Petro”) as a potential sanctions-circumvention tool. It marked a notable expansion of U.S. sanctions into cryptocurrency-related activity.
President Trump issued Executive Order 13835, restricting certain transactions involving debt owed to the Government of Venezuela, including accounts receivable and debt used as collateral, and limiting certain sales or pledges of government equity interests. These restrictions aimed to reduce options for restructuring or monetizing state assets to raise funds. Together with earlier orders, it deepened pressure on the Venezuelan state’s financial maneuvering.
President Trump issued Executive Order 13850, expanding sanctions tools by authorizing blocking (asset-freezing) sanctions on persons operating in specified sectors of Venezuela’s economy or connected to corruption and other harms. This executive order became a key mechanism for later designations of major Venezuelan state entities. It also broadened the sanctions strategy from mainly financial restrictions to sector-based blocking authorities.
OFAC designated Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) under Executive Order 13850 for operating in the oil sector of Venezuela’s economy. As a result, PDVSA’s property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction were blocked, and U.S. persons were generally prohibited from dealing with it absent authorization. This was a major turning point because it directly targeted Venezuela’s key state oil company and primary source of hard-currency revenue.
OFAC designated the Central Bank of Venezuela pursuant to E.O. 13850, describing the step as intended to prevent the bank from being used to support the Maduro government’s activities. Blocking the central bank increased pressure on financial channels that can be used for international transactions, while Treasury stated it took steps to allow ordinary card transactions, remittances, and humanitarian assistance to continue. This move signaled an intensified focus on the Venezuelan state’s financial infrastructure.
President Trump issued Executive Order 13884, which blocks all property and interests in property of the Government of Venezuela that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons. This greatly expanded the sanctions scope beyond targeted actors by treating the government broadly as a blocked party, subject to general and specific licenses for allowed activity. It established the most sweeping U.S. sanctions posture toward the Venezuelan state in this period.
After the Venezuelan government and opposition announced a resumption of talks in Mexico City and a humanitarian agreement, OFAC issued Venezuela General License 41. The license authorized Chevron to resume limited operations in Venezuela under defined conditions, while Treasury emphasized it was structured to prevent PDVSA from receiving profits from Chevron’s oil sales. This marked a shift toward using time-limited licensing as an incentive linked to negotiations and humanitarian goals.
OFAC issued Venezuela General License 44, temporarily authorizing a broad set of transactions related to oil and gas sector operations in Venezuela, following an announced political agreement between the Maduro government’s representatives and the opposition. The authorization was time-limited and framed as reversible based on democratic and electoral commitments. It represented one of the widest short-term relaxations of Venezuela-related oil restrictions since PDVSA was blocked in 2019.
OFAC replaced General License 44 with General License 44A, narrowing the authorization to allow only certain wind-down activities through a specified end date. The change followed U.S. statements that Venezuela’s government had not fully met commitments tied to democratic elections and political rights. This step illustrated the “snap-back” design of sanctions relief—temporary easing followed by re-tightening when conditions were judged unmet.
OFAC issued Venezuela General License 41B, authorizing the wind-down of certain transactions related to Chevron’s joint ventures in Venezuela. This signaled another tightening phase, shifting from permitting ongoing operations to managing an exit under U.S. sanctions rules. By this point, the sanctions program had evolved into a cycle of broad blocking authorities with carefully scoped licenses that could expand or contract based on U.S. policy judgments.
United States Sanctions on Venezuela (2004–present)