The United States created a sanctions framework for Venezuela under Executive Order 13692. It authorized blocking (freezing) assets and restricting entry for individuals involved in undermining democratic processes or committing human rights abuses. This set the legal basis for later, larger sanctions lists targeting officials and connected networks.
OFAC designated 13 current or former senior Venezuelan officials as the government prepared elections for a National Constituent Assembly. The designations were aimed at individuals linked to actions described by the U.S. as undermining Venezuela’s democratic institutions. This helped expand the personal-sanctions list beyond a small set of earlier cases.
OFAC designated President Nicolás Maduro under E.O. 13692, a rare step aimed at the head of state. The announcement tied the action to the Constituent Assembly process and broader repression claims. This signaled an escalation from targeting officials around Maduro to targeting Maduro himself.
Executive Order 13808 added major financial restrictions, limiting certain transactions in “new debt” and new equity tied to the Government of Venezuela and PdVSA. While not a full trade embargo, it tightened funding channels and increased compliance risk for parties dealing with Venezuelan state entities. These broader rules interacted with targeted listings by making business networks more vulnerable to sanctions exposure.
The European Union introduced restrictive measures in November 2017, including an arms embargo and a system for travel bans and asset freezes on listed individuals. This created a parallel, targeted listing approach outside the U.S. system. Over time, EU renewals and updates maintained pressure through person-by-person listings rather than broad trade bans.
Executive Order 13827 prohibited U.S. persons from dealing in digital currency, coin, or token issued by or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela after January 9, 2018. OFAC clarified that the “petro” and “petro-gold” are covered by the prohibition. The move reflected how sanctions programs began to anticipate evasion attempts through new financial instruments.
Executive Order 13835 prohibited certain transactions involving Venezuelan government debt, collateralized receivables, and transfers of equity interests in entities the government owned 50% or more. The stated aim was to block attempts to monetize or pledge state assets during the crisis. This further narrowed pathways for government-linked business networks to raise cash despite prior sanctions.
Executive Order 13850 authorized OFAC to block property of persons operating in Venezuela’s gold sector and other sectors designated later. This was important for “business networks” because it allowed listing not just government officials, but also companies, intermediaries, and shipping assets tied to targeted sectors. It became the main legal tool for many entity and network designations after 2018.
In January 2019, OFAC updated the SDN list and issued General License 6 linked to a case described as a currency-exchange scheme benefitting regime insiders. The action showed how Venezuela sanctions lists increasingly targeted private-sector enablers and media/business holdings connected to sanctioned individuals. It also highlighted the compliance concept that entities owned 50% or more by blocked persons can become blocked in practice.
OFAC designated PdVSA in January 2019 for operating in the oil sector under E.O. 13850, freezing property under U.S. jurisdiction and generally barring transactions by U.S. persons. This was a turning point because many related companies and shipping arrangements faced heightened sanctions exposure. It also set up later actions aimed at oil shipments and sanctions-evasion logistics.
Executive Order 13884 blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Venezuela under U.S. jurisdiction, greatly expanding restrictions beyond individual SDN listings. While targeted designations continued, this order increased the default risk of dealing with state bodies and state-owned enterprises. It also strengthened tools to target non-U.S. persons who materially support the blocked government.
OFAC designated Alex Saab and related individuals/entities for alleged corruption connected to Venezuela’s CLAP food program, then expanded those designations to family members and controlled companies. This is a clear example of “targeted personal and entity sanctions” reaching across borders through shell companies and affiliates. The case illustrates how sanctions lists are used to disrupt business networks that support, or profit from, government programs.
OFAC designated shipping companies, vessels, and related actors involved in moving Venezuelan oil, describing these flows as sanctions evasion that supported the Maduro government. This showed how sanctions lists evolved from naming officials to identifying logistics assets (like tankers) that enable revenue generation. Some delistings were also used as leverage when companies changed behavior and adopted compliance measures.
After Venezuela’s July 28, 2024 presidential election, OFAC sanctioned additional security and cabinet-level officials aligned with Maduro, citing repression and actions taken after the vote. This marked a renewed, event-driven expansion of the targeted-person list focused on accountability for specific episodes. It reinforced the pattern that sanctions lists can grow quickly around political turning points.
In December 2025, the EU renewed its Venezuela restrictive measures through January 10, 2027, including travel bans and asset freezes for listed individuals. The renewal emphasized continuity: the EU kept targeted listings in place rather than shifting to broad measures aimed at the general economy. This sustained international coordination keeps pressure on named officials and limits their access to overseas financial systems.
In early 2026, the U.S. issued Executive Order 14373 on safeguarding certain Venezuelan oil revenue held in U.S. accounts, while OFAC issued General License 46 to authorize specific activities involving Venezuelan-origin oil under defined conditions. Together, these steps show an outcome of the long-running sanctions-list era: the U.S. continued targeted enforcement against evasion networks while also creating controlled channels for permitted oil-related transactions. The sanctions system therefore evolved into a mix of (1) listings against officials and business networks and (2) detailed licensing rules that govern which oil-linked dealings are allowed.
Sanctions Lists Targeting Venezuelan Officials and Business Networks (2017–present)