In 1585, open war began between England and Spain, building on earlier maritime rivalry and raids. English commanders increasingly used privateering—state-authorized raiding by private ships—to attack Spanish shipping and ports, including in Spain’s American empire.
In early 1586, an English expedition led by Francis Drake captured and occupied Santo Domingo (on Hispaniola) long enough to demand a ransom. The attack showed how vulnerable major Spanish Caribbean towns could be to fast-moving raiders operating far from Europe.
Drake’s forces seized Cartagena de Indias in February 1586 and held it while demanding payment. Cartagena was a major Spanish port on the “Spanish Main,” so its temporary capture had outsized psychological and financial impact and encouraged further raiding strategies.
In late May 1586, Drake captured and burned St. Augustine, the main Spanish settlement in Florida at the time. The raid highlighted that English privateering and coastal attacks could strike Spanish positions across a wide arc of the Atlantic world.
In 1604, England and Spain made peace through the Treaty of London, ending the long 1585–1604 war. With peace restored, the English crown moved to reduce official privateering against Spain, although smuggling and later wars would revive attacks in new forms.
In May 1624, the Dutch West India Company captured Salvador (Bahia) in Brazil, then part of the Iberian Union (Portugal under the Spanish crown). This attack showed the Dutch strategy of combining state-backed commerce, war, and privateering to weaken Iberian Atlantic power.
A large Spanish–Portuguese expedition retook Salvador in 1625, reversing the Dutch conquest. The rapid counterattack demonstrated how seriously Iberian authorities treated threats to major Atlantic ports and how contested these spaces had become.
In September 1628, Dutch forces under Piet Hein captured much of a Spanish treasure fleet near Matanzas, Cuba. The seizure struck directly at Spain’s war finances and became a model for targeting the transatlantic flow of American silver rather than only raiding towns.
In May 1655, English troops seized Jamaica from Spain during Oliver Cromwell’s “Western Design.” Jamaica soon became a key English base that supported privateering and buccaneering against Spanish shipping and coastal towns across the region.
In mid-1668, buccaneers led by Henry Morgan attacked and captured Porto Bello (Portobelo), a fortified port tied to Spanish American trade routes. The raid showed how raiders operating from English bases could overwhelm defenses and force ransoms, even at strategic Spanish hubs.
In 1670, England and Spain signed the Treaty of Madrid to reduce conflict and “depredations” (raiding) in the Americas. Spain accepted the principle that areas actually held by England belonged to England, helping turn earlier conquests like Jamaica into legally recognized footholds.
In May 1697, a French-led expedition under the Baron de Pointis captured and looted Cartagena de Indias during the War of the Grand Alliance. The raid reflected a shift toward large, state-supported privateering operations designed to extract wealth and damage Spanish American defenses during European wars.
On 8 June 1708, a British squadron attacked a Spanish treasure convoy off Cartagena during the War of the Spanish Succession. The battle showed how European naval warfare and privateering aims overlapped: intercepting American silver shipments was a direct way to weaken Spain’s ability to fund war.
Between 1713 and 1715, the Treaties of Utrecht and related agreements helped end the War of the Spanish Succession and reorganized European rivalry. Spain kept its American empire, but new commercial arrangements expanded competitors’ access to Atlantic trade, changing the context in which privateering against Spanish America had flourished from 1585 to 1715.
Anglo‑Dutch‑French privateering and attacks on Spanish America (1585-1715)