Poland passed the Act on Toll Motorways and the National Road Fund, creating a legal basis for financing and operating motorways with user charges. The law became a key early framework for bringing in private participation through concessions and for organizing long-term road funding.
Croatia granted a long-term concession to BINA Istra to develop and manage the Istrian Y network (A8/A9), funded through tolling. This became one of the region’s more durable concession examples, combining public and private participation over multiple construction phases.
Hungary opened the M1–M15 motorway section under a long-term concession and funded it largely through toll revenues. This was an early, high-profile attempt in Eastern Europe to apply a Western-style build-operate concession model to a major international corridor.
Poland awarded a concession for part of the A2 motorway to Autostrada Wielkopolska after a public tender, then signed the concession agreement later the same year. The arrangement committed the concessionaire to raise financing and build, operate, and maintain the road, linking delivery to future toll revenues.
Croatia established Autocesta Rijeka–Zagreb (ARZ) and granted it a long-term concession to develop, maintain, and operate the Zagreb–Rijeka motorway. The move used a dedicated concession company to organize financing and management for a strategic corridor connecting the capital to a major port region.
Toll revenues proved insufficient to cover debt service, and the M1–M15 concession moved toward effective nationalization. The case became an important lesson for later projects: traffic and willingness-to-pay risks could overwhelm early concession structures if toll levels were politically and socially contested.
For the A2 concession section, financial closing enabled full-scale construction to proceed, and toll collection began after sections entered operation. This marked a practical shift from policy design to sustained concession-based motorway operations and revenue collection in Poland.
Romania signed a major contract with Bechtel to design and build the Transylvania Motorway, a flagship project meant to improve cross-country connectivity. The project later became widely cited in the region as a cautionary case about procurement approach, cost control, and delivery risk in large motorway programs.
Bulgaria awarded a long-term concession intended to finance and operate the Trakia motorway through toll revenue, aiming to accelerate delivery ahead of EU accession. The award was controversial because it was widely reported as lacking a competitive tender, which weakened political support for the model.
Slovakia’s R1 expressway became the country’s first road project delivered through a PPP structure, with a long-term concession awarded to a private-led vehicle. Unlike classic toll concessions, the project was designed around government availability payments (regular payments for keeping the road available at required standards), reducing direct traffic-revenue risk.
The Bulgarian government published documentation related to the Trakia motorway concession and, after continued financing and implementation problems, moved away from the concession approach. The motorway was subsequently advanced largely through alternative contracting and funding routes, including EU-backed approaches rather than a toll concession.
Romania announced the termination of the Bechtel agreement for the Transylvania Motorway after years of delays and limited delivered mileage. Officials stated that the next steps would include tendering the remaining works, including considering concession-type approaches for completing the corridor.
Adoption of motorway concession and tolling models in Eastern Europe (1990–2015)