John Rae departed Repulse Bay (in today’s Nunavut) as part of a Hudson’s Bay Company overland survey. While his main task was mapping, the wider Arctic search effort meant he also gathered any news about the missing Franklin expedition. His travel methods—small parties, local foods, and over-ice routes—shaped what he could learn and carry back.
In late March 1854, Rae set out again from Repulse Bay with a small party, pulling sledges over sea ice and snow. This leg of the expedition brought him into contact with Inuit groups near Pelly Bay. Those encounters became the key channel for learning what had happened to Franklin’s men.
On 21 April 1854, near Pelly Bay (now Kugaaruk), Rae met Inuit who told him that a group of Europeans had died of starvation near a large river (understood as the Back River, also called the Great Fish River). This was among the first credible reports placing Franklin survivors on a fatal retreat toward the mainland. The report mattered because it shifted attention away from sea-only searches toward the overland route to the Back River area.
As Rae continued and later recontacted Inuit groups, he obtained items identified as belonging to Franklin expedition officers, including pieces of silverware and other personal objects. These artifacts provided physical proof alongside oral testimony, making the information harder for officials to ignore. The purchases also show how Inuit knowledge and trade networks preserved key evidence.
Rae prepared a formal account for the British Admiralty describing Inuit testimony and the Franklin-related objects he had obtained. In the report (dated 29 July 1854), Rae concluded that signs on bodies and cooking remains indicated some survivors had resorted to cannibalism while starving. This conclusion became the most controversial part of his message, even though it was presented as evidence-based reporting.
Rae’s report was made public in Britain, including publication in The Times on 23 October 1854. Many readers focused on the cannibalism claim and dismissed Inuit testimony as unreliable, turning a search update into a cultural controversy about “heroic” naval behavior. The reaction shaped later decisions about who was believed and how evidence from Indigenous witnesses was treated.
After receiving Rae’s information, the Admiralty pushed for additional overland checking near the Back River area to look for more traces. This step showed that, despite public controversy, officials treated Rae’s evidence as important enough to guide new fieldwork. It also kept the search effort focused on the retreat route described by Inuit witnesses.
In December 1854, Charles Dickens published essays arguing against Rae’s cannibalism conclusion and portraying Inuit accounts as untrustworthy. Dickens’ intervention mattered because it amplified elite skepticism and influenced popular memory of the Franklin disaster. The dispute became as much about reputation and national identity as about evidence.
In 1855, Hudson’s Bay Company officer James Anderson and his clerk James Green Stewart traveled toward the mouth of the Back River in response to the new intelligence. They met Inuit with additional materials linked to Franklin’s ships and confirmed that no survivors were found. Their journey reinforced Rae’s main conclusion: the expedition’s remaining men had perished after abandoning the ships.
Jane, Lady Franklin, rejected Rae’s account and worked to protect the honor of her husband and his men, including by rallying influential supporters. The campaign mattered because it helped sideline Rae’s role in the story, even as later discoveries broadly matched the retreat scenario he reported. It also shows how personal and political pressure could shape which evidence was accepted.
Unable to accept uncertainty, Lady Franklin funded a new private search expedition, buying the steam yacht Fox and appointing Francis Leopold McClintock to command it. The expedition aimed to gather definitive documents and physical proof, not just secondhand testimony. This marked a shift from debating Rae’s report to trying to confirm the story on the ground.
In spring 1859, McClintock’s parties reached King William Island and found written messages (including the Victory Point note) that confirmed the ships had been abandoned and the crew attempted a desperate march south. The expedition returned in September 1859 with evidence that ended most remaining doubt about the expedition’s outcome. Together with Rae’s 1854 report, these finds formed a consistent narrative: abandonment, retreat toward the Back River, and mass death under extreme conditions.
John Rae and the 1854 Report on Franklin's Fate (1853–1859)