Soviet designer Vladimir Chelomei proposed Almaz as a crewed military reconnaissance space station during the Cold War. The idea was to place people in orbit to operate powerful cameras and other sensors for observing targets on Earth. This proposal set in motion a program that would later fly under the civilian-sounding “Salyut” name.
The USSR launched Salyut 1, the world’s first space station, showing that long-duration orbital habitats were possible. It was derived from an Almaz-related design lineage and helped establish the broader Salyut program framework. This civilian program later provided cover names for Almaz military stations.
The first Almaz Orbital Piloted Station (OPS-1) reached orbit publicly labeled Salyut 2 to hide its military purpose. The station soon suffered major failures, including loss of control and depressurization, and it was never visited by a crew. The early failure highlighted how difficult it was to keep a large crewed reconnaissance platform operating reliably.
After only a short time in orbit, Salyut 2 (OPS-1) reentered Earth’s atmosphere without ever being occupied. Its rapid loss underscored that the Almaz approach still needed major improvements in systems reliability and station operations. The program continued, aiming for a station that could support real crewed work.
The second Almaz station, OPS-2, launched successfully and was publicly announced as Salyut 3. Like OPS-1, it was presented as part of the Salyut program to disguise its reconnaissance role. Getting OPS-2 into stable orbit was a major step toward demonstrating a workable crewed military outpost.
Soyuz 14 delivered Pavel Popovich and Yuri Artyukhin to Salyut 3, completing the first successful crewed visit to an Almaz station. The crew stayed about two weeks and carried out Earth-observation work consistent with a reconnaissance platform. This mission was the clearest proof that Almaz could be crewed and operated in orbit.
A second crew, launched on Soyuz 15, reached Salyut 3 but could not dock due to problems with the Igla automated rendezvous and docking system. With limited power and fuel, the crew had to return to Earth after about two days. The failure showed that docking reliability was a major risk for sustaining a crewed military station program.
Salyut 3 (OPS-2) was taken out of orbit and burned up in the atmosphere after its operational period. Its single successful crewed expedition and one failed docking attempt provided important lessons for later stations. The program then shifted focus toward launching a more capable third Almaz station.
The third and final flown Almaz station, OPS-3, was launched and publicly designated Salyut 5. It continued the practice of masking military reconnaissance missions inside the Salyut series. Salyut 5 aimed to achieve longer, more productive crewed operations than the earlier Almaz stations.
Soyuz 21 docked with Salyut 5, bringing Boris Volynov and Vitaly Zholobov to the station. They carried out a long stay (for the time) and conducted station work and observation tasks. The mission demonstrated that the program could sustain a crewed military station for weeks, not just days.
Soyuz 23 attempted to reach Salyut 5 but failed to dock after problems during rendezvous. The spacecraft returned to Earth and made an unusually hazardous landing in severe weather, ending the mission early. The incident reinforced how a station program depended on reliable docking systems and safe crew return options.
Soyuz 24 successfully docked with Salyut 5, bringing Viktor Gorbatko and Yury Glazkov. The crew carried out repairs and station operations, including addressing reported air contamination by venting the atmosphere. This was the last crewed visit to any Almaz station, marking the end of crewed OPS operations in the program’s flown form.
With no further sustainable crewed operations planned, Salyut 5 (OPS-3) was intentionally deorbited and destroyed on reentry. This ended the three-station sequence of flown Almaz military outposts (Salyut 2, 3, and 5). The end of Salyut 5 made clear that the program’s crewed station approach was reaching its practical limits.
By 1978, Soviet decision-makers concluded that maintaining crewed military stations did not deliver enough benefit compared with automatic reconnaissance satellites. This judgment effectively closed the story arc of Almaz as a flown crewed station program, even though later hardware and ideas were reused in other forms. The outcome helped shift Soviet emphasis toward longer-lived scientific stations and uncrewed military systems.
Almaz military space station program and related Salyut missions (1964–1978)