H. A. Prichard’s article argued that moral philosophy often makes a mistake when it tries to prove why we should do our duty using non-moral premises. He defended an intuitionist view: some obligations are grasped directly in moral thought rather than inferred from claims about what is good or beneficial. This set an influential Oxford background for later intuitionist and deontological work, including Ross’s.
Ross composed the material that became The Right and the Good during the late 1920s. In this period he developed a “pluralist” deontology: morality involves several basic kinds of duty, not just one master rule like maximizing happiness. The book’s structure reflects that aim by separating questions about right action (what we ought to do) from questions about the good (what is valuable).
Ross’s The Right and the Good appeared in 1930 with Oxford’s Clarendon Press. The book became the best-known statement of his intuitionist, non-consequentialist ethics in which moral knowledge relies on reflective judgment and basic moral truths are treated as objective. Its publication gave English-language moral philosophy a major alternative to utilitarian and other single-principle theories.
In The Right and the Good, Ross argued that there are multiple basic prima facie duties—real moral reasons that always count, even though they can conflict. He listed duties such as fidelity (keeping promises), reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence (not harming others). This helped explain why moral decision-making often involves weighing competing considerations instead of applying a single formula.
A central move in Ross’s book was to insist that rightness (what we must do) cannot be reduced to producing goodness (valuable states of affairs). He argued that some duties arise from past actions and relationships—like promises and reparations—so right action is not simply “maximize value.” This distinction shaped later debates about whether moral theories can fully reduce duties to outcomes.
In 1935–36 Ross delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen, developing a broader account of ethical theory and moral psychology. The lectures explicitly acknowledged key influences from H. A. Prichard and G. E. Moore while continuing Ross’s focus on moral consciousness and reflective judgment. This lecture series became the basis for his later book Foundations of Ethics.
A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) popularized logical positivism in the English-speaking world and argued that many philosophical statements fail tests of meaning based on verification. The book also defended an emotivist view of moral language, treating moral judgments as non-factual expressions rather than statements known by intuition. This created a tougher intellectual climate for intuitionist moral realism like Ross’s.
Ross published Foundations of Ethics in 1939 (Clarendon Press), presenting the Gifford Lectures in book form. While continuing his intuitionist approach, Ross revisited how duties relate to intrinsic value and how ethical theory should be constructed from moral experience. The book also shows Ross responding to a changing philosophical scene in which verificationism and non-cognitivism were increasingly influential.
A. C. Ewing reviewed Ross’s Foundations of Ethics in the journal Philosophy (Royal Institute of Philosophy) in 1940. The review indicates the book’s immediate reception within professional philosophical circles and situates Ross as a major participant in British ethical theory. Reviews like this helped keep Ross’s work visible as debates about moral language and moral knowledge intensified.
C. L. Stevenson’s Ethics and Language (1944) developed and defended emotivism, a view that treats moral claims as primarily expressing attitudes and influencing behavior rather than stating facts. This approach reinforced a major metaethical alternative to Ross’s intuitionism and moral realism. By mid-century, many discussions of normative ethics had to address these metaethical challenges about what moral statements even mean.
R. M. Hare’s The Language of Morals (1952) offered a prescriptivist theory of moral language: moral judgments function like universalizable prescriptions (guides for action) rather than straightforward reports of fact. Hare accepted some non-descriptive elements emphasized by emotivists while rejecting the idea that moral talk is only emotional expression. This further shifted the philosophical center of gravity away from Ross’s intuitionist epistemology, even as Ross’s pluralist duties remained influential in normative ethics.
By around 1960, English-language ethics had been strongly shaped by debates over verificationism, emotivism, and prescriptivism, often skeptical of intuitionist moral knowledge. Even so, Ross’s core normative contribution—explaining moral life through multiple prima facie duties and the right–good distinction—remained a lasting reference point for later pluralist and deontological theories. The overall reception from 1930 to 1960 is therefore mixed: increasing pressure on his metaethics, alongside continuing influence of his normative framework.
W. D. Ross's prima facie duties and The Right and the Good: publication and reception (1930–1960)